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INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment compensation has been with us for 
over two decades. The Social Security Act of 1935, in 
conformance with which the various State Unemployment 
I 
Compens~tion Laws were enacted, came into existence during 
the Gre~t Depression. Since that time unemployment 
compensation has had to cope with the problem of cyclical 
I 
unemplo~ent no less than five times. 
i With the development of aggregate economic 
thought ~n the United States, Great Britain, and else-
, 
where, c~rtain economic programs that have tended to 
offset changes in the magnitude of national income were 
consider~d by many economists and others, to be what is 
termed automatic stabilizers. An automatic stabilizer is 
I 
a deviceithat adds to the Nation's disposable income during 
periods of contraction, reduces the Nation's disposable 
income i-q. periods of prosperity, and immediately goes into 
action without delay or need for new legislation. 
! It is the purpose of this Thesis to show that 
I 
unemployment compensation is an automatic stabilizer, 
a'hat it <Ioes add to the Nation's disposable income on 
periods of contraction, reduces disposable income in 
prosperit~, and performs these functions automatically. 
9 
The analysis, to bear out the hypothesis, will 
consist of five parts, each of which is a Chapter. 
1. The past and present objectives of unemploy-
ment compensation. 
2. The relation of unemployment compensation to 
automatic stabilizers. 
3. The effect of unemployment compensation on the 
Nation's transfer payments. 
4. The Anti-business cycle performance of 
unemployment benefits and tax collections. 
5. Variables that influence the degree of 
adequacy of unemployment compensation 
functioning as a stabilizer. 
Chapter I discus~es the objectives at the 
inception of the program, the objectives of today (1959), 
and determines if the objectives are those of establishing 
an automatic stabilizer within the economy. 
Chapter II presents a detailed definition of 
automatic stabilizers, and relates unemployment compensation 
to this definition. 
Chapter III analyzes the effect unemployment 
compensation has on the total amount of transfer payments 
(payments to individuals for which they render no current 
service) during periods of prosperity and unemployment. 
10 
Chapter IV analyzes how successful benefits 
were in replacing the income lost during the recessions 
of 1948-1950, 1953-1955, and 1957-1959. Taxes, or 
employer contributions, are analyzed in terms of their 
cyclical behavior. 
Chapter V discusses the influence of variables 
on the degree of adequacy of unemployment compensation 
functioning as a stabilizer. These variables are: the 
degree of coverage, the distribution of coverage, the 
duration of benefits, and supplementary unemployment 
benefits. 
Chapter VI contains a summary of the 
conclusions obtained. 
This Thesis will concern itself solely with the 
problem of automatic stabilization and will not offer 
opinions, or even probe for answers to the countless 
other problems of unemployment insurance as such. 
Problems such as incentive to work, available for work 
and the like are deemed beyond the scope of this Thesis 
and not relevant to the main problem. 
11 
CHAPTER I. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
aims and objectives of unemployment insurance in the United 
States, and to discover if one of the objectives is to 
establish an automatic stabilizer within the economy, in 
the sense of increasing governmental outlays during 
recessions and of decreasing outlays in booms without 
relying on specific congressional policy decisions. 
This chapter is divided into two major sections. 
(A) the change that has taken place in what is to be the 
basic objectives of the program, and (B) a comparison of 
the British system of unemployment compensation to the 
American system. The comparison consists of two parts; 
(1) the difference in attitude as to who should be respon-
sible for unemployroent: the individual employer, or 
society as a whole, and (2) the difference, if any, in 
what each system considers its respective objectives to be. 
A. The Change in Objectives. 
As it was mentioned previously, the objectives 
and aims of unemployment compensation have changed since 
the time of the first attempts to legislate an insurance 
12 
program. Consequently, the aims before and during the 
Great Depression are not those of today.(l959) The next 
few pages will be concerned with: (1) the objectives 
before any legislation, (2) the objectives of the 
Wisconsin Act, (3) the objectives under the Social 
Security Act, and (4) the present day objectives. 
1. Early Objectives of Unemployment Compensation. 
The desire for unemployment insurance was 
expressed by a few members of Congress shortly after the 
turn of the century. In 1916, a resolution was introduced 
in Congress to create a commission for the development of 
a national system of unemployment compensation, and in 
1928, a similar Bill was introduced into the House. In 
both cases no further action was taken. 
In 1934, a year before passage of the Social 
Security Act, which established our present system, a 
third Bill, meeting with no success, was introduced by 
the Farm-Labor Party. This Bill would have provided for 
unemployment compensation to be paid from Federal funds 
to all unemployed over the age of 18 for an unlimited 
. d * per~o • 
*12 P.6 
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The underlying purpose behind these attempts 
was to make available a uniform system of benefits to 
unemployed persons that would obviate the problems 
arising from local relief programs. The Great Depression 
encouraged the development of what is called the uohio 
School", which placed the emphasis on benefits instead 
of prevention; however, the plan enacted in the United 
States was fashioned after the ttWisconsin School'1 , which 
advocated prevention of economic idleness. Unemployment 
was to be prevented not through outlays, but by offering 
financial incentive via a tax reduction to those 
employers with a low rate of layoffs. 
2. The Objectives of the Wisconsin Act. 
Unemployment insurance first became a reality 
in the United States in 1932 with the passage of the 
Wisconsin Act by the State of Wisconsin. 
It was conceived that this plan would provide a 
program of unemployment benefits and exert pressure on 
employers to reduce the rate of layoffs, and consequently, 
increase the stability of employment. 
The plan was original and not based on the 
British system of compensation which is explained in a 
later section of this chapter. Professor John R. Commons 
14 
states that: ttThe Wisconsin Act avoided the socialistic 
features of British law because the State did not go 
into the insurance business; it avoided paternalism 
because it did not pay out relief for avoidable unemploy-
ment; and businessmen were provided incentive to make a 
profit or avoid a loss by improving efficiency of labor 
management. n* 
The Wisconsin School of thought assumed that 
employers themselves could stabilize employment: 
*12 P.6 
** 9 P.80 
t1Just as employers are now required by 
law to pay workmen's compensation for 
accidents, so they should in the future 
pay limited unemployment compensation 
to laid-off workers. Both accidents 
and unemployment are industrial hazards 
and genuine production cost to be 
prevented where possible but compen-
sated where unavoidable. The time 
must come when those business units 
which fail to meet the true social costs 
of their irregular operation will no 
longer be considered either socially or 
. . . ** f~nanc~ally solvent.n 
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It is evident that those people who advocated 
the program were of the opinion that unemployment could 
be prevented by efforts of employers. This was based on 
the records of workmen's compensation laws that foisted 
accident preventive responsibility onto employers by 
being assessed a smaller rate when accidents were at a 
low frequency. Because great progress was made with 
accident prevention, it was assumed that experience rating 
could become an integral part of unemployment compensation 
and foster the stabilization of employment. 
The Wisconsin plan later recognized that there 
may be types of unemployment over which the employer has 
no control and that this should be the responsibility of 
other agencies. 
The purpose, outlook, and objectives of the 
Wisconsin Act provided the background for the Unemployment 
Insurance aspect of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
3. Objectives Under the Social Security Act of 1935. 
Prior to the passage of the Social Security Act 
many people felt that any form of payment to those out of 
work would only breed idleness. At the same t~e others 
were of the opinion that it is the responsibility of the 
Government to care for those forced into idleness by 
16 
economic conditions. The Seventy-Fourth Congress of the 
United States, while considering the pros and cons of 
unemployment insurance, expressed the following views: 
"The essential idea in unemployment compen-
sation, more commonly but less accurately 
called unemployment insurance, is an 
accumulation of reserves in times of employ-
ment from which partial compensation may be 
paid to workers who become unem~loyed and 
are unable to find other work.t* 
nwe •••••• believe that the Federal Law should 
provide for recognition ••• to employers who 
have regularized their employment •••• All 
unemployment cannot be prevented by 
employers, but many employers can do much 
more than they have done in the past to 
regularize employment."** . 
"'The Senate Finance Committee Report also 
indicates that the cost of benefits, 
limited both in amount and duration, 'is 
very properly to be regarded as a part 
of the legitimate cost of production, to 
be paid for by the consumer'."* 
Furthermore, 
"Benefits should be limited to 'partial' 
compensation during a relatively short 
period following unemployment, while the 
worker is seeking other employment or 
waiting to return to his old job.n** 
Thus it was the opinion of Congress that 
unemployment should concern itself with assisting those 
unemployed for short periods of time, and exert pressure 
on employers to stabilize their employment. First of all, 
* 6 P.l2 
**6 P.7 
the theory of individual responsibility was the pre-
dominant objective for the passage of the insurance 
program and little thought was given to unemployment 
insurance functioning as a countercyclical force for 
the purpose of stabilizing the volume of employment. 
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It was not conceived that unemployment compensation could 
react for the betterment of all (by offsetting some of 
decline in laborftlcome) during periods of economic 
dislocation. The reason was that during the t~e of 
passage of the Social Security Act there was little 
information on the functions of unemployment benefits 
and other Government expenditures in terms of national 
income and consumption. The theory of the Multiplier 
appeared in 1931, by R. E. Kahn; however, articles on 
aggregate economics during the period of 1930 through 
1936 were somewhat unaccepted until the General Theory, by 
J. M. Keynes appeared. Even the noted economist, Professor 
A. Hansen, as late as 1936, was very skeptical of public 
works and Government expenditure as employment st~ulus.* 
With the development of aggregate economic 
thought, the theory of individual responsibility gave way 
to the theory of collective responsibility. What is 
termed the theory of collective responsibility assumes 
unemployment to be a characteristic of the private 
*3 P.31-48 
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enterprise system. Unemployment becomes a collective 
responsibility, not an individual one, as causes of 
unemployment can be beyond the control of individual 
employers. With the gradual acceptance that unemploy-
ment is pr~arily outside of the sphere of control of 
any single employer, the objectives of the program began 
to change. 
Secondly, it was assumed that a financial 
incentive for entreperneurs to stabilize their labor 
force would reduce the fluctuations in employment. 
Stabilization of employment was t~e main concern; however, 
stabilization meant the individual employer stabilizing 
his employment; it did not mean stabilization of cyclical 
employment. Furthermore, offering a financial incentive 
was ~ means of reducing some of the opposition to unemploy-
ment compensation. 
4. Present Day Objectives. 
Today some Economists and Government Officials 
are becoming increasingly aware of unemployment compensation 
and automatic stabilization, while others are already 
completely convinced and advocate the importance of realizing 
the relationship of the program and stabilization. 
19 
This increasing awareness is reflected by the 
Study Committee on Unemployment Compensation Employment 
Security when it stated the objective to be: 
nrt not only encourages the stabilization of 
employment and the alleviation of the effects 
of unemployment or unemployed workers and 
their families, but the parment of benefits 
also has a counter-cyclica effect on the 
economy tending toward maintenance of 
purchasing power.n 
''Unemployment insurance constitutes one of 
the major approaches of Government in the 
problem of alleviating the privation caused 
by involuntary short-term unemployment. 
It also helps to cushion the initial effects 
of a depression, although no system of 
insured weekly cash benefits can be considered 
as a satisfactory approach by itself to the 
problem of contracted employment during a 
depression."* 
Recently (1958) the Department of Labor published 
a booklet entitled t1The Adequacy of Benefits of Unemploy-
ment Insurancen, which expressed the Department's views 
on the present objectives of the program, as being: 
*44 P.l2 
Nl. To replace enough of the current wage 
loss of unemployed workers to meet the 
program's requirements so that most such 
workers would not have to turn to other 
programs for aid, under normal or recession 
conditions. To this some would add that the 
program should forestall exhaustion of 
savings or resort to credit for basic 
needs; others suggest that the program cannot 
be so liberal as to make unnecessary a 
moderate use of savings during unemployment. 
Some would urge that benefit levels should 
enable workers substantially to maintain 
their customary level of living without 
diminishing their savings appreciably. 
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As to the period during which these goals 
would operate, some would say 'moderate 
recession' rather than 'recession'; others, 
on the other hand, would expect the program 
to meet its objectives not only in a period 
of recession, but in a period of more 
serious economic dislocation, at least in 
its early stages." 
''2. To compensate for wage loss in such a 
way as to help provide a sense of security 
for the covered work force - - the feeling 
of assurance based on the knowledge which 
individuals have that they will surely be 
compensated for periods of involuntary 
unemployment should they become unemployed.rt 
'"3. To help maintain essential consumer 
purchasing power, thus helping to brake 
a downturn in business activity, and 
sustain the confidence of the community, 
locally or nation-w·ide as the case may be. n* 
B. Comparison to the British. 
In discussing the development and objectives of 
unemployment compensation in the United States, mention 
was made of the fact that our system differs from that of 
Great Britain in terms of functions, objectives, and social 
philosophy. It was also mentioned that in the United 
States there has been a growing realization of the fact 
that unemployment compensation may be considered as an 
automatic stabilizer, but was not enacted as such. This 
*45 P.3 
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section will concern itself with 1) the differences 
between the British and American systems and ~) whether 
the function of automatic stabilization was the paramount 
objective in bringing about the unemployment insurance 
program of Great Britain. 
In 1911 Great Britain established the first 
compulsory system of unemployment benefits. Originally 
the application was only to six industries employing 
about 2,500,000 workers, but has since been extended. 
One fundamental difference between the British 
and American systems is that in Great Britain the Govern-
ment contributes to the insurance fund agency with the 
employer, whereas in the United States the Federal and 
State Governments theoretically do not. 
Benefits vary under the British plan set-up with 
the age and sex of the employee, while under the American 
plan the contribution is based on a certain percentage of 
wages covered by the worker regardless of sex or age.* 
The origin of the British national system of 
unemployment insurance may be traced to the unsatisfactory 
results of the earlier methods of relieving the able-bodied 
unemployed. The recurrence of unemployment focused public 
*1 P.33 
22 
attention on the urgent need for assistance. The object-
ive of unemployment insurance was to care for an anti-
cipated unemployment average of six percent of the labor 
force. 
The scope of this insurance system was widened 
in 1920 to include practically all of the industrial 
working population of the country. Chronic unemployment 
lay ahead for Britain, and by the middle of 1921 the 
insured unemployed amounted to 25 percent of the labor 
force. 
A departure from the original limited liability 
scheme was made in 1921, when, because of serious unempley-
ment, benefits were granted in excess of the amount 
justified by contributions. The extended benefits were 
regarded as a temporary advance against future contributions; 
however, they were never intended to continue beyond what 
was then considered an emergency of short duration. As 
unemployment remained at high levels it became necessary 
to prolong the extension. By 1921, relief outside the 
insurance program was assumed by the State.* 
Today Great Britain's unemployment insurance is 
covered by the National Insurance Act of 1946. 
23 
Neither the United States nor Great Britain 
incorporated unemployment insurance to function as a 
built-in stabilizer. Great Britain differs from the 
United States in that unemployment was and is considered 
to be collective responsibility and that economic unemploy-
ment is beyond the scope of the control of the individual 
employer, whereas our employment compensation was formed 
on the basis of individual responsibility, as it was felt 
employment should be stabilized by individual employer 
actions when given financial incentive to do so (i.e., 
experience ratings.) 
c. Conclusion. 
The objectives of any unemployment insurance 
program prior to 1932, were primarily that of providing 
some means or placing benefits in the hands of the unemployed. 
The Wisconsin Act was conceived with the basic aim of 
preventing unemployment by offering employers a financial 
incentive to stabilize their labor force. The aims held 
by those responsible for legislation of our unemployment 
compensation were that basically of the Wisconsin Act. 
There had been very little consideration of the 
possibility of unemployment compensation functioning as an 
automatic stabilizer in the economy. As we increased our 
24 
knowledge of the business cycle and aggregate economics, 
it became apparent that one of the important a~s of the 
program could be that of automatic stabilization. 
The basic difference between Britain and the 
United States is that Britain assumes unemployment to be 
a collective responsibility with unemployment beyond the 
control of individual employers, whereas the United States 
views unemployment as an individual responsibility, based 




UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
definition of an automatic stabilizer, to explain and 
analyze the important functions that a stabilizer 
performs, and to relate unemployment compensation to the 
definition and requirements of an automatic stabilizer. 
The chapter will consist of two major sections: 
(1) a definition of an automatic stabilizer, and (2) the 
relation of unemployment compensation to the definition 
and eharacteristics of an automatic stabilizer. 
A. The Definition of an Automatic Stabilizer. 
The American Economy has incorporated into its 
economic system, certain devices that attempt to stimulate 
economic activity in a slump and to curb it in a boom. 
These devices are considered to be countercyclical, due to 
the fact that they operate inversely to the movements of 
the business cycle. Simply, an automatic stabilizer acts 
as damper in booms by attempting to reduce the disposable 
income of thepopulation, and as a st~ulator in recessions; 
by adding to disposable income. 
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Professor A~bert G. Hart in his book Money, Debt 
and Economic Activity, defines an automatic stabi~izer as 
a device that: 
~. Pushes the Government's budget towards a 
deficit in the case of a s~ump and towards 
a surp~us as business improves. 
2. Expands the pub~ic's stock of cash in a 
s~ump and reduces it in prosperity. 
3. Tends to reduce the public's demand for 
cash in a slump and to increase it in 
prosperity. 
4. Goes into action without waiting for fresh 
policy decisions.* 
1. Government Budget. 
An automatic stabilizer pushes the Government's 
budget toward a deficit in the case of a slump and toward 
a surplus as business improves. 
It is a we~l known fact that deficit spending by 
the Government will add to the total stock of disposable 
income, for the simp~e reason that it is spending more than 
its tax receipts. It is a~so a well known fact that accumu-
~ating a surplus by co~lecting more in taxes than it is 
spending will reduce disposab~e income. This is exactly 
*2 P.475 
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what an automatic stabilizer does. The budget or fund of 
a stabilization program will be in the black or red depend-
ing upon economic conditions. During a recession, the 
program will be paying out more than it takes in, and 
conversely during booms. For any Government policy or 
program to be considered an auto-stabilizer it must exert 
pressures on the Government budget to create deficit 
spending or a tax surplus. This does not mean however that 
for a stabilizer to be functioning correctly, the total 
Government budget must show a deficit of surplus, as the 
amount of spending or taxes of the program may be small 
in relation to the total spending, or tax collections of 
the Government. The important consideration is that the 
automatic stabilizer show a surplus or deficit, whichever 
the case may be, in relation to its own budget or fund. 
2. The Public's Stock of Cash. 
An automatic stabilizer expands the public's stock 
of cash in a slump and reduces it in prosperity. In a period 
of declining economic activity, there will be pressures 
exerted to increase the flow of funds into the economy. 
The stabilizer accomplishes the expansion by increasing 
Government payments to the economic population and reducing 
Government tax receipts. In periods of full employment the 
opposite would be true, it will reduce the stock of cash by 
increasing tax receipts and reducing payments and/or 
28 
expenditures. Whether or not there is an actual change 
in the quantity of money will depend on the size of the 
program in relation to total Government spending and tax 
collections. 
3. The Public's Demand for Cash. 
An automatic stabilizer tends to reduce the 
public's demand for cash in a slump and increase it in 
prosperity. The stabilizer by causing changes in the 
quantity of money will effect the demand for (cash) 
liquidity. If during a slump, the stabilizer succeeds 
in increasing the quantity of money, then the demand to 
increase cash holdings would be reduced. The household 
receiving cash payments, during the prevailing economic 
dislocation, would have a lower marginal utility of money 
and a higher spending rate, then would have been the case 
if no payments were forthcoming. In prosperous periods, 
if the stabilizer succeeded in reducing or preventing 
further expansion of the money supply, pressures would be 
applied to increase the demand. A reduction in the 
present and anticipated liquid assets would increase the 
marginal utility and lower spending rates. 
4. Policy Decision. 
An automatic stabilizer goes into action without 
waiting for fresh policy decisions. This is the important 
29 
characteristic that distinguishes an automatic stabilizer 
from other Government programs that are occasionally used 
to combat the business cycle. For an automatic stabilizer 
to be considered automatic it must perform the necessary 
functions without requiring policy decisions or new 
legislation. When economic activity starts to decline and 
unemployment is on the increase, the stabilizer must: 
(1) increase spending beyond tax receipts, (2) increase the 
public's stock of cash, and (3) reduce the public's demand 
for cash. When prosperity is present and there are 
inflationary pressures, the stabilizer must: (1) increase 
tax receipts beyond spending, (2) decrease the public's 
stock of cash and, (3) increase the public's demand for 
cash. The effectiveness of the auto-stabilizer to 
perform these functions is directly related to the ability 
of the program to perform in an automatic manner; allowing 
action to take place without delay. 
Automatic stabilizers are subject to certain 
limitations which influence its degree of effectiveness 
in stimulating and curbing economic activity. One very 
important limitation is that of the size of the program 
in relation to the total Government budget. If the increase 
in spending is negligible compared to the total of Govern-
ment spending; the effect of the stabilizer on the total 
of economic activity will be but little. If the increase 
in taxes under the program is small in comparison to total 
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tax receipts of the Government, the effectiveness in curbing 
a boom will also be inadequate. Besides size, another 
limitation is that of time. If there is a pronounced time 
lag between the beginning of the decline of economic 
activity and the increase in spending, the effectiveness 
will be severely hampered. As economic unemployment 
continues and the depression or recession deepens, the 
larger will be the spending requirements of the program 
to restore employment.. To function ideally, a stabilizer 
should swing into action as soon as the economy enters the 
downward side of the business cycle, and n0t wait until the 
trough is almost reached. 
B. Unemployment Compensation and Automatic Stabilization. 
Relating Professor Hart's definition and character-
istics of an automatic stabilizer to unemployment compen-
sation will assist in determining if it can b~ considered 
as one. Assuming the definition to be a valid one, and 
c0nsidering the characteristics as necessary ingredients, 
of any stabilization program, it is imperative to see if 
anemp~oyment compensation has these characteristics and can 
fit into the framework put forth by Professor Hart. This 
will merely show the possibility of stabilization reaction 
and the feasibility of classification, it is not to deter-
mine if unemployment compensation is an automatic stabilizer. 
31 
1. Government Budget. 
During periods of unemployment and depressed 
economic activity, payments made to individuals by the 
unemployment program exceeds the amount of taxes collected 
by it. Thus exerting actual pressure to create a budgetary 
deficit. Aa an employer reduces his labor force, those 
individuals laid off will begin to collect benefits from 
the unemployment fund. The amount of benefits will 
exceed, by a considerable sum, the amount in taxes the 
respective employer is contributing to the fund. When 
sales have increased and the employer has re-hired and/or 
increased his labor force, the amount paid into the 
unemployment fund by the employer will exceed the amount 
paid out in.benefits. 
2. The Public's Stock of Cash. 
Unemployment compensation, by providing cash payments 
to households and collecting a payroll tax from employers, has 
a direct effect on the quantity of the stock of cash. A 
qualified unemployed individual receives payments directly 
from the unemployment fund. The payment of benefits replaces 
im part the loss of income suffered by the worker. As far as 
the individual is concerned the benefits are a form of income 
which may be disposed on the market according to his or her 
own preference. The taxes paid by employers are deposited 
in an unemployment trust fund maintained by the Treasury 
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Department. These accounts are kept separately and 
returned to the dispensing agency as needed for the pay-
ment of benefits. The balance is held in the trust fund. 
During a recession, when payments are being made, there is 
a net outflow from the Treasury and coversely a net inflow 
in prosperity. The net outflow increases the stock of cash 
and the net inflow decreases it. 
3. The Public's Demand for Cash. 
Unemployment compensation tends to reduce the 
demand for (cash) liquidity during periods of economic 
distress and to increase it in a prosperous period. The 
tendency to reduce the demand is brought about by unemploy-
ment compensation providing cash payments, which exerts 
pressure to expand the money supply, to certain members of 
thepopulation during a slump. Furthermore, the assurance 
that payments will be forthcoming, should unemployment arise, 
tends to offset or reduce the precautionary motive to increase 
cash holdings when economic pessimism prevails. Conversely, 
in periods of economic plenty, pressures to increase demand 
may be brought about by unemployment compensation taxing 
members of the economy and reducing their liquid assets. 
4. Policy Decisions. 
There is no need for new legislation or policy 
decisions every time an economic slump occurs. Unemployment 
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compensation starts providing payments to qualified un-
employed persons within a very short time after they have 
been laid off. In forty-five states unemployed workers 
start receiving compensation after one week of total 
unemployment.* 
C. Conclusion. 
The conclusion of this chapter is that unemploy-
ment compensation pDssesses the characteristics necessary 
to render it capable of f~ctioning as an automatic 
stabilizer. It is one thing to be able to perform a task 
and quite another to have accomplished it. Accomplishment 
is dealt with in the next two chapters; which are detailed 
discussions of the program functioning as a stabilizer. 
Even though we may claim that theoretically it is an auto-
matic stabilizer, has it actually reached as one in past 
business cycles? 
*9. P. 59 
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CHAPTER III. 
COUNTERCYCLICAL IMPACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ON 
TRANSFER PAYMENTS 
The preceding chapter concluded that unemploy-
ment compensation may be thought of as an automatic 
stabilizer, but it in no way touched upon its actual 
behavior. That will be the purpose of this and the 
next chapter. This chapter will analyze the counter-
cyclical impact _of unemployment compensation on transfer 
payments. 
The analysis will consist basically of two 
parts: (1) a definition and breakdown of transfer payments 
in the economy, and the relationship on unemployment 
benefits to total transfer payments (unemployed benefits 
are considered to be a part of the total amount of 
transfer payments paid to individuals in the economy), 
and (2) a discussion of the countercyclical movement of 
transfer payments. The objective of the first part is to 
show the percentage unemployment benefits comprise of 
transfer payments during each of the three recessions 
analyzed in this Thesis. The second part is an analysis 
and determination of the cause of the countercyclical 
pattern of transfer payments. 
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A. Transfer Payments. 
Transfer payments are considered to be money 
disbursements to individuals for which they render no 
service currently. Public transfer paym~nts are disbursed 
by Government agencies - Federal, State and local. The 
major components are: social insurance (including unemploy-
. . 
ment c;ompensation), public as~istance interest payments 9~ 
the national debt, and veteran's benefits. There are also 
certain misceilaneous smaller outlays which constitute such 
a Bmall portion that no future identification be needed. 
There are four major classifications of need for transfer 
payments, these are: survivorship, disability, unemploy-
ment and old age.* Payments for each of these needs are made 
under: social insurance, public assistance and veterans' 
benefits. 
1. The Growth of Transfer Payments. 
There are ~any reasons why transfer payments have 
grown from an annual r~te of $3.1 billion in 1940 to $24.6 
billion in 1958. Increase in population, aging of the 
population, increase in the national debt, liberalization of 
eligibility requirements, and legislation extending the 
coverage of various programs are some of these reasons. Old-age 
and retirement payments have increased from $0.8 billion in 
1940 to $9.9 billion in 1958, 
*18 P.268 
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survivorship and eligibility payments have increased 
from $0.7 billion in 1940 to $7.5 billion in 1958, 
unemployment compensation, with the increase in payments 
and coverage, has resulted in a continuing increase mf 
the .average annual benefits since 1940. Finally, 
veterans' benefits and miscellaneous payments have 
decreased from $4.5 billion in 1948 to $3.1 billion in 
1958.* 
This growth has resulted in a changing pattern 
of transfer payments. In 1948 social insurance comprised 
bat 20 percent of total transfer payments whereas in 1958 
it amounted to over 60 percent. Veterans' benefits have 
decreased from 46 percent of the total in 1948 to 18 
percent in 1958. 
In relation to personal income, transfer 
payments have risen from 2 percent in 1929 to 7 p~rcent 
of personal income in 1958.** 
2. Unemployment Benefits. 
Although unemployment benefits depend on the level 
of unemployment for their absolute amount, they can be 
compared with the total of social insurance and transfer 






· ment benefits in the past few years have varied between 
25 and 50 percent. In comparison to total transfer 
payments the variance has been 6 percent in periods of 
near-full employment and as high as 20 percentdlring 
the 1958 recession. 
First considering the 1948-1950 recession, we 
find that unemployment benefits increased from $0.9 
billion in October of 1948 to a high of $2.5 billion in 
March of 1949. Percentage-wise, unemployment compensation 
increased from 8 percent to 20 percent of transfer payments 
during this period. As the economy recovered from the 
recession the percentage of unemployment benefits to total 
transfer payments decreased. 
During the 1953-1955 recession a similar movement 
of unemployment benefits was observed (See Table II.) 
Increasing from 5 percent to a high of 18.2 percent of 
transfer payments, and then decreasing as unemployment 
declined. 
The recession of 1957-1959 showed unemployment 
benefits again moving in the same direction as in the two 
previous recessions. Tables I, II, III, shows the 
percentage relationship of unemployment benefits and 
transfer payments. From observing the movement of 
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TABLE I. 
PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
TO TOTAL TRANSFER PAYMENTS - ~948-~950 RECESSION 
(~) (3) 
Annua~ Amount (2) Benefits as 
Transfer Annua~ Arnoun t a percent 
Payments Benefits of payments 
Month (in bil~ions) (in bi~~ions) (Co~.l t- Col.2) 
Oct. ~0.4 .90 8.5% 
Nov. ~0.4 .98 9.4 
Dec. ~0.7 ~.30 ~2.1 
1949 
Jan. ~~-~ ~-7~ ~5.4 
Feb. 11.5 ~.95 16.9 
Mar. ~2.6 2.55 20.2 
Apr. ~2.4 2.24 18.0 
May ~2.2 2.29 ~8.7 
June ~2 .. 3 2.40 19.5 
July ~2.4 2.37 19.~ 
Aug. ~2.6 2.34 ~8.5 
Sept. ~2.6 ~.95 ~5.4 
Oct. ~2.0 1.70 ~4.1 
Nov. ~2.4 1.89 ~5.2 
Dec. ~2.8 2.~2 16.5 
~950 
Jan. ~8.3 2.30 ~2.5 
Feb. 22.2 2.07 9.3 
Mar. 24.2 2.31 9.5 
Apr. 17.2 ~.20 7.2 
Source: Amounts of Transfer Payments and Unemp~oyment Benefits 
taken from the Survey of Current Business, U. S. 
Department of Commerce, January ~950 - January ~959. 
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TABLE II. 
PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
TO TOTAL TRANSFER PAYMENTS - 1953-1955 RECESSION 
(1) (3) 
Annual Amount (2) Benefits as 
Transfer Annual Amount a percent 
Payments Benefits of payments 
Month (in billions) (in billions) (Col.l • Col.2) 
Oct. $14.5 $ .86 5.9% 
Nov. 13.9 1.03 7.4 
Dec. 14.4 1.59 11.0 
1954 
Jan. 14.8 2.11 14.2 
Feb. 15.0 2.38 15.8 
Mar. 15.8 2.89 18.2 
Apr. 15.9 2.71 17.0 
May 15.8 2.47 15.6 
June 15.8 2.53 16.0 
July 15.8 2.23 14.1 
Aug. 15.5 2.20 14.1 
Sept. 16.0 2.11 13.1 
Oct. 16.5 1.90 11.5 
Nov. 16.4 1.86 11.3 
Dec. 17.0 2.16 12.7 
1955 
Jan. 17.0 2.38 14.0 
Source: See Table I. 
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TABLE III. 
PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
TO TOTAL TRANSFER PAYMENTS - 1957-1959 RECESSION 
(1) (3) 
Annual Amount (2) Benefits as 
Transfer Annual Am.oun t a percent 
Payments Benefits of payments 
Month (in billions) (in billions) (Col.l + Col.2) 
Sept. $21.2 $1.47 6.9% 
Oct. 22.1 1.69 7.6 
Nov. 23.0 1.78 7.7 
Dec. 23.3 2.71 11.6 
1958 
Jan. 23.9 4.08 17.0 
Feb. 23.8 4.16 17.4 
Mar. 24.8 4~82 19.4 
Apr. 26.1 5.24 20.0 
May 26.4 4.59 17.3 
June 26.0 4.20 16.1 
July 26.5 4.51 17.0 
Aug. 26.8 4.35 1 6.2 
Sept. 27.0 4.15 15.3 
Net. 26.9 3.64 13.5 
Nov. 26.6 2.89 10.8 
Dec. 26.0 2.56 9.8 
1959 
--
Jan. 25.8 3.63 11.7 
Feb. 26.1 2.77 10.6 
Sources: See Table I. 
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unemployment compensation it may be concluded that when 
unemployment occurs, benefits increase and cause trans-
fer payments to rise. When employment is restored, 
benefits decline and transfer payments fall. This 
countercyclical movement of transfer payments will be 
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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B. The Countercyclical Movement of Transfer Payments. 
Having discussed in general, transfer payments 
and the relation of unemployed compensation, we now turn 
to the determination and analysis of the countercyclical 
movement of transfer payments. 
1. Statistical Procedure. 
In order to analyze the movements of transfer 
payments in terms of countercyclical or cyclical action 
several Statistical computations must be employed. First, 
the long-run growth trend must be removed from the raw 
data, and secondly, the seasonal variation must be removed. 
The remainder then represents the cyclical and erratic 
factors, which now may become subject to measurement in 
an attempt to disclose the movement of the data. Computing 
the trend using seasonally adjusted data, results in an 
amount which is considered to be the normal and is used for 
comparison to the actual data. The relationship between 
the seasonally adjusted trend and the actual data is 
expressed as percent. The percentage relationship is 
either plus or minus, depending on whether the actual data 
is above or below the seasonally adjusted trend. The data 
are converted to standard deviations, i.e., the average 
of the percent deviations is obtained and used in calculating 
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the deviation from normal. For example, if the average 
percent deviation for transfer payments was 20 percent, 
a 40 percent differential between the actual data and the 
normal (seasonally adjusted trend) would be 2 standard 
deviations. The purpose for expressing the data in this 
manner is to allow various time series to be reduced to a 
comparable basis, each expressed in terms of its own 
standard deviation. 
For this analysis, personal income was the time 
series selected to compare to the movements of transfer 
payments. It was felt that personal income represents the 
aggregate sum of purchasing power for individuals in the 
economy and varies directly with the level of employment. 
The average of the percent deviations for personal income 
was found to be 2.4 percent as compared to 20 percent for 
transfer payments. This is understandable as a decline of 
$10 billion on personal income might well be only a 5 or 8 
percent change whereas a decline of that magnitude in trans-
fer payments could amount to over a 50 percent change. The 
inclusion of transfer payments in personal income adds 
stability to personal income, however, changes in personal 
income cannot be completely offset by changes in transfer 
payments because of the respective magnitudes. 
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The movements of the two time series (transfer 
payments, and personal income) are shown on Chart I and 
cover the period 1948-1959. This period was selected 
because it encompassed the past three recessions and it 
is these recessions that will be analyzed in terms of 
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2. Transfer Payments and Personal Income Movements. 
The plotted data on Chart I shows the counter-
cyclical movement of transfer payments. Starting with 
the 1948-1950 recession, we see that transfer payments 
increased above normal in contrast to the decline in 
personal income below normal. The extremely high peak 
of transfer payments at the beginning of 1950 was due to 
veterans' insurance dividends which was a one-shot 
proposition. Although at an opportune time, it should be 
eliminated in analyzing the countercyclical movements. 
As personal income rose in the middle of 1950, 
transfer payments reacted in a countercyclical manner and 
dropped below normal where they remained throughout the 
prosperous period of 1950-1953. When-. personal income 
dropped below normal during the latter part of 1953, 
transfer payments increased, but did not rise above normal. 
Throughout the entire recession of 1953-1955 transfer 
payments rem~ined below normal. It may be stated that 
there was countercyclical action on the part of transfer 
payments due to the upward movement of .68 standard 
deviations, but this was far less than the downward move-
ment of personal income, which was 1.70 standard deviations. 
Upon the restoration of employment and personal income, in 
April 1956, transfer payments remained below normal and 
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then increased with personal income, so that at the 
beginning of the 1957-1958 recession, transfer payments 
were above normal, and then increased in a countercyclical 
fashion to the decline in personal income. 
In answer as to whether transfer payments have 
reacted countercyclically or not, yes they have done so, 
especially during the 1948-1950 recession and the 1957-1958 
recession. Reaction during the 1953-1954 left something 
to be desired, but, it becomes a question of magnitude as 
the direction of movement was certainly countercyclical. 
3. The Relationship of Changes in Transfer Payments to 
Changes in Unemployment Compensation. 
Having concluded that transfer payments react in a 
cyclical manner the next step is to determine if the 
changes in the annual rate of unemployment benefits are 
responsible for the countercyclical movement of transfer 
payments. 
First of all, an analysis was made to determine the 
degree of influence that unemployment benefits exerted on the 
countercyclical_movement of transfer payments. Benefits were 
removed from transfer payments and the remainder compared 
(in standard deviations) to the movement of personal income 
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and transfer (including benefits) payments. This was done 
for each of the recessions under consideration and is 
shown on Chart II. 
By analyzing the movements of the two time series: 
"Transfer Payments· and Transfer Payments minus Benefits 11 
during each recession, it becomes apparent that transfer 
payments display an upward movement in recession that 
exceeds the countercyclical pattern of transfer payments 
minus benefits. This indicates that the change in the 
magnitude of benefits is responsible to a great extent for 
the countercyclical pattern of transfer payments. 
The 1948-1950 recession witnessed transfer payments 
increasing from +.20 standa~deviations in October 1948 to 
+.90 in March 1949, a net increase of .70, whereas transfer 
payments minus benefits, for the same period, increased from 
-.30 standard deviations to .00, a net gain of .30. 
During the 1953-1955 recession, transfer payments 
increased from -.68 standard deviations in October 1953 to 
-.18 in September, 1954, a net gain of .55, as compared to a 
net increase in ·transfer payments minus benefits of· .20. 
At the time of the 1957-1959 recession, transfer 
payments, between September 1957 and July 1958, increased 
.98 standard deviations, whereas transfer payments minus 
benefits increased .35. 
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Secondly, an analysis was made to determine, for 
each recession, the ratio between the change in benefits 
and the change in transfer payments. 
During the recession of 1948-1950, the increase in 
unemployment benefits amounted to 80 percent of the increase 
in transfer payments. Transfer payments increased 2.0 
billion dollars between October 1948 and July 1949, whereas 
benefits increased 1.6 billion for the same period. (See 
Table IV.) 
During the 1953-1955 recession, increased benefits 
amounted to 86 percent of the increase in transfer payments. 
Transfer payments increased 1.5 billion between October 1953 
and September 1954. Increased benefits amounted to 1.3 
billion of the increase. (See Table IV). 
During the 1957-1959 recession, benefits constituted 
75 percent of the increase in transfer payments. Transfer 
payments increased 4.9 billion dollars between September 1957 
and April 1959, benefits amounted to 3.7 billion of the 
increase. (See Table IV) 
As the economy entered the downswing phase of the 
three recessions considered, transfer payments exerted 
countercyclical pressures on the economy by the amount of 
the increase in the rate of payments. Increased benefits 
were 75 to 86 percent of the incremental increase in 
payments. 
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The important thing to be considered is, what 
effect has unemployment benefits had on transfer payments 
moving countercyclically? It was observed that unemploy-
ment benefits have varied betweBn 10 and 20 percent of the 
amount of transfer payments, and yet in terms of incremental 
change, unemployment benefits have comprised between 75 and 
86 percent of the change in the rate of transfer payments. 
C. Conclusions: 
The basic findings of this chapter show that as 
unemployment benefits increase, total transfer payments 
also increase, and conversely when benefits decrease. 
Transfer payments have increased in amount due to many 
factors, but the reason that they move in a counter-
cyclical fashion is due to unemployment compensation. 
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TABLE IV. 
INCREASE IN BENEFITS AS A PERCENT OF THE 
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THE COUNTERCYCLICAL PERFORMANCE OF BENEFITS AND COLLECTIONS. 
According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, the United States from 1858 to 1959, has gone 
through twenty-five business cycles. However, only since 
.1939 has unemployment compensation been a compensatory 
factor on the business cycle. 
It is the objective of this chapter to determine 
and analyze the countercyclical performance of unemployment 
benefits and tax collections. 
The discussion will consist of (1) benefits and 
the loss of purchasing power caused by unemployment, (2) the 
impact of benefits during the recessions of 1948-1950, 1953-55, 
and 1957-59, (3) collections and the method of determining 
them, and (4) the cyclical pattern of collections. 
A. Benefits and the Loss of Purchasing Power. 
A loss of income to a family is their loss of 
purchasing power. The larger the amount of benefit payments 
to individuals out of work, in relation to the income lost, 
the greater will be the amount of purchasing power replaced. 
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A look at the trend of wages and benefits will 
provide an indication of the past and present ability of 
benefits to restore losses of purchasing power. 
The rate of coverage weekly benefits to average 
weekly wages has declined since 1940. Weekly payments to 
unemployed workers have risen from an average of $10.50 
in 1940 to an average of $30.58 in 1958; in contrast to wages 
which increased from an average weekly wage of $24.20 in 
1940 to $87.71 in 1958. 
It is evident that increases in benefits have 














AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFITS AS A PERCENT 
OF AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES 
(1) (2) (3) 
Benefits as 
Average Weekly Average Weekly a percent 
Benefits Wages of wages 
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(Dollars) (Dollars) (Col.l + Col.2) 
$10.56 $24.20 43.6% 
20.48 54.92 37.2 
20.76 59.33 34.9 
21.09 64.21 32.9 
22.79 67.97 33.5 
23.58 71.69 32.8 
24.93 71.86 34.6 
25.08 79.99 31.3 
28.21 83.39 34.2 
30.58 83.71 36.5 
Source: Average Weekly Benefits and Average Weekly Wages 
were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, U. S. Department of Commerce, 
1950-1959. 
The reader should be aware that the average weekly wages are 
those of manufacturing employees and the disparity between 
wages and benefits will vary according to industry. However, 
manufacturing wages are adequate for the purpose here, which 
is to indicate the trend of disparity between wage increases 
and benefit increases. 
The trend indicates that there has been a 
decline in the ability of benefits to replace wages 
that have been lost due to unemployment. 
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The reduction in the ability of benefits to 
restore purchasing power results from the lag of benefit 
increases to wage increases. Since 1954 some progress 
has been made. Today in 42 states with 89 percent of 
covered workers, the maximum with dependents is $45.00 
and without dependents the maximum is $30.00. Changes 
would have to be made in most state laws to allow maximum 
benefits to be either three-fifths or two-thirds of the 
average weekly wage. And as of September, 1958, only 
5 states could achieve this by increasing the maximum 
by $10.00 or more. 
The U. S. Department of Labor in their pamphlet 
'''Adequacy of Benefits onder Employment Security", in 1958 
.stated: 
"The surveys clearly indicate that during their 
current spell of unemployment beneficiaries did 
not receive benefits which compensated for as 
much as 50 percent of their actual wage loss. 
This was partly due to the fact that weeks of 
unemployment were not compensated because of 
delayed filing, waiting weeks, disqualifications, 
and so on. For single claimants and families 
with the chief wage earner out of work, the 
relatively low level of total benefit received 
takes on added significance when one considers 
that the net wage earnings of the claimant had 
constituted, on the average, from 75 to 100 
percent of the total cash income available 
to the household before his unemployment. 
Wages of the non-head claimant made up a 
much smaller proportion of the family's 
income before unemployment. 
55 
ttLooking at how far benefits went in 
covering total expenses and non-deferrable 
expense during unemployment, the various 
surveys indicate that on the average, the 
weekly amount paid to single beneficiaries 
constituted between 57 and 73 percent of 
their total weekly expense and was enough 
to cover, or more than cover, their non-
deferrable expense. Somewhat by contrast, 
the coverage weekly benefit amount was 
paid to heads of households covered between 
36 and 48 percent of their total weekly 
expenses and between 60 and f8 percent 
of their non-deferrable expenses.* 
Professor Slichter states that unemployment 
benefits compare very favorably to public works in prevention 
of the loss of purchasing power. 
ttin three important respects unemployment 
reserves appear to be superior to public 
works - or at least to a very large program 
of public works. In the first place, under 
most schemes of the unemployment reserves 
the public credit is not ordinarily involved 
and deflation effects which accompany fears 
concerning benefits does not peg the prices 
of capital goods and thus tends to make a 
resumption of change and growth unprofitable. 
On the contrary, it affects primarily the 
prices of consumer's goods and, by supporting 
these prices, accelerates the time when a 
resumption of growth is advantageous. In the 
third place the disbursement of employment 
benefits automatically diminishes as business 
improves. Hence there is no danger that these 
disbursements will be an inflationary influence 




It is quite apparent that as unemployment 
spreads, income of the Nation declines, unemployment 
benefits provide a cushion, thus becoming a compensatory 
factor on the business cycle. 
The 1954 Economic Report of the President 
states that: 
nBecause the flow of security to the individual 
has been built primarily on welfare consideration, its 
contribution to the economic progress of the United 
States has not been adequately appreciated • 
Unemployment payments can help to curb economic decline 
during·an interval of time that allows other stabilizing 
measures to become effective. t'* 
If benefits are replacing only a small percent 
of the income lost, then the stabilizing effects are that 
much less. For example, if benefits are of such magnitude 
in relation to income so as to replace only twenty-five 
percent of the purchasing power decline, then during a 
depression or recession we may consider unemployment 
compensation to be only twenty-five percent effective in 
preventing an initial decline from culminating downward. 
*9 P.96 
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For the purpose of this sTiliple example we must assume 
other variables such as, degree of coverage, duration 
of benefits, to be constant. The effect of these 
variables will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The advocation of either an increase or 
decrease in benefits is beyond our problem, as this Thesis 
is an analysis of the present system to functinn as a 
built-in stabilizer. This is not to say an increase in 
benefits would not enhance the effectiveness of unemploy-
ment insurance as a stabilizer. 
In conclusion, it should be stated that when 
unemployment insurance is to be used as a stabilizer 
there should not be too sizeable a differential between 
wages and insurance payments. 
B. The Countercyclical Impact of Benefits in Recent 
Recessions. 
We now turn to the impact of benefits in replacing 
recession lost income on an aggregate basis. 
To measure the impact of benefits on the business 
cycle a method was employed which approximated the compensa-
tory function during the downswing, that is from peak to 
trough. The one weakness in this method is that at the 
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next peak, unemployment usually exists, as the peak will 
be, in statistical terms, below normal or the seasonally 
adjusted trend, due to long run growth factors. For 
example, aggregate labor income will increase due to 
secular forces, increased population, new entries to the 
labor force, and yet unemployment will still be consider-
able, with benefits being paid out. However, for the 
purpose of the analysis of this Thesis, measurement of 
the impact of benefits during a downswing will be 
sufficient to determine their countercyclical effect. 
The measurement is obtained by computing the 
9umulated decrease in labor income from the peak to 
trough on a monthly basis, and contrasting this to the 
increase in benefits. The impact is then determined by 
computing what percentage the increase in benefits is of 
the decline in labor income. 
Employing this method of measuring the loss of 
income in relation to benefits, an analysis was made of 
the 1948-1950, 1953-1955, and 1957-1959 recessions. 
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1. The 1948-1950 Recession. 
This was the first post-war recession (we are 
not considering the recession of 1945-1946, as this was 
primarily due to the conversion of industry to peacetime 
operation), and the first recession to observe the effect 
of unemployment benefits. 
In October, 1948, labor income was at a peak of 
. 
$140.1 billion from which it declined to a low of $134.4 
billion in November of 1949. The absolute loss (not 
adjusted for trend) was $5.7 billion. Unemployment 
compensation rose from $.9 billion to a high in March, 
1949, of $2.5 billion, and then declined to $1.9 billion 
in November, 1949. The increase in benefits at the 
beginning of 1949 amounted to 52 percent of the loss in 
income, however, by November it amounted to only 17 
percent. 
Table VI shows that as the recession continued 
on through 1949 the impact of benefits lessened. Primarily 
this was due to prolonged unemployment in certain areas 
which resulted in 38 percent of the beneficiaries exhaust-
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2. The 1953-1955 Recession. 
In October, 1953, labor income was at a peak 
of $205.7 billion, declining to $202.0 billion in 
September, 1954. An absolute loss of $3.7 billion. On the 
other hand, benefits increased from $.8 billion in October 
to a high of $2.8 billion in March, and fell to $2.1 
billion by September. Percentage-wise, (See Table VII) 
benefits increased, from replacing 14 percent of the 
decline in labor income to 44 percent, and then declined 
as the recession continued, to 33 percent by September, 
1954. 
Benefits comprised a greater offset to labor 
income than in the 1948-1950 period, due to the following 
reasons: (1) the exhaustion of benefits was less, 26 per-
cent as compared to 38 percent, (2) the amount of benefits 
increased from an average of $20.00 in· 1948-1950 to $24.00 
in 1953-1955, (3) during the recession the drop in labor 
income was smaller by $1 billion than the 1948-1950 
recession, with employment compensation increasing as much,, 
(4) the rate of decline was slower and (5) the period of 

















UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS AN OFFSET 
TO LOSS OF LABOR INCOME 
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3. The 1957-1959 Recession. 
Unemployment benefits reacted most favorably during 
this recession. A decline of $8.8 billion of labor income 
was offset or replaced by 42 percent, from an increase in 
unemployment benefits of $3.7 billion. The period under 
consideration, September, 1957, through May, 1958, was off-
set by an average of 34 percent. 
Table VIII shows that benefits offset the decline 
in labor income from a low of 13 percent in October, 1957, 
to the previously mentioned 42 percent in April, 1958.' 
The peak to trough in this recession was relative-
ly short, a period of 9 months as compared to 14 months 
during the 1948-1950 recession; however, the drop in income 
was considerably greater. Even with the greater decline, 
benefits replaced a larger overall percentage of the loss in 
labor income than in the two previous recessions. This was 
due to: (1) weekly benefits increased from an average of 
$24.00 in 1953-1955 to $30.00 in 1957-1959, (2) the coverage 
of workers in non-agricultural employment increased from 
75.6 percent in 1953 to 82.2 percent in 1957 (See Table X) 














UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS AN OFFSET 
TO LOSS OF LABOR INCOME 
September (Peak) 1957 - May (Trough) 1958 
Labor Income 























































a Percent of 
Decrease in 
Labor Income 













The method of financing the program is an 
important aspect of unemployment compensation function-
ing as an automatic stabilizer. If the program is to 
perform the stabilization function then it must collect 
funds in a cyclical manner: that is, tax more heavily 
during prosperous periods than during periods of 
unemployment. Collections must increase with the 
increase in employment and income, and conversely, 
decrease when employment and income does. 
The program is financed by taxing employers 
on their payrolls. The employer must pay a tax based 
on a certain percentage of his payroll, the system for 
determining what thetax rate is termed 11 Experience 
Rating". 
In theory, experience rating is designed to 
prevent unemployment by offering employers a financial 
incentive to stabilize their operations. As mentioned 
in Chapter I, experience rating was adopted in the 
Wisconsin Act of 1932 on the basis of a precedent 
established from the experience with Workmen's Compen-
sation. Lower rates were charged to employers with low 
66 
accid~nt rates. Lt was felt ttif industrial accidents 
I 
i 
have qeen reduced by charging each employer with their 
I 
cost, \employment can be reduced if the expense of 
unemp~oyment benefits is charged in the same manner."* 
There are different systems of experience 
I 
ratin~ in use by the States; the most popular is the 
! Reserv
1
e Ratio Formula in use by 32 states. 
Under the Reserve Ratio Formula each employer 
has a ~eparate account in which is entered the amount 
I 
of paytoll contributed to the fund and the benefits paid 
I 
I 
to his[employees. The benefits are deducted from contri-
1 
bution~ and the balance is divided by the payroll to 




Another type of experience rating is the 
Benefi~ Ratio Formula, which is a Ratio computed by 
I 
dividi1g the total amount of benefits paid out in the 
















that employers must pay is of a disadvantage 
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. I 
to tbie program functioning as a stabilizer. During 
perio:ds of full employment when the rate of layoffs 
I 
is lo~, the emplo~er receives a lower tax rate which 
consebuently reduces the amount of collections. And 
I 
in pe~iods of economic dislocation when layoffs are 
prevelant, the employer's tax rate is raised. This is 
i 
especfally the case with the Benefit Ratio Formula, 
I 
as d~ing any period of three years the lower the amount 
of betefits, the lower will be the tax rate. 
I 
In essence, the use of experience rating allows 
the reduction of tax rates when economic conditions are 
I. 
good, ·benefits are held to a minimum,. and there is an 
accum.Jlation of reserves. The longer the upswing of the 
cycle the greater tendency for rate reduction. 
Table IX summarizes the level of average 
colledtion tax rates during the period 1938-,1958, and 
the nJmber of states using experience rating. It may be 
observled that in periods of economic plenty the taxrates 
are 1d,wer than at other times. Furthermore, there has 
! 
. 
been no widespread prolonged unemployment since 1939, 
I 
and cobsequently the tax rate has displayed a downward 




11The net effect of experience rating is 
inequ·table and erratic tax production. It is suggested 
that I he states be permitted to limit their collections 
by flat rate (or horizontal) reductions, which would 
apply to all employers alike. A flat rate imposed upon 
payrolls automatically results in a high income to 
I 
the 11employment fund during high employment levels and 
in a educed income when payrolls are at a low level. 
I When both payrolls and individual employer rates vary 
from ~ear to year, automatic adjustment is more difficult 


























AVERAGE EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION RATES 
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
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Number of States using 











































Source~ Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 
I 1938-1951, U. S. Department of Labor, 1952; Supple-
ment to the Handbook of Unemployment Insurance 
Financial Data, U. S. Department of Labor, 1955; 
Labor Market and Employment Security, U. S. Department 
of Labor, July, 1958. 
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D. T~e Cyclical Pattern of Collections. 
Employing the identical statistical procedure 
that was discussed in Chapter III to compute the move-
ment o~ transfer payments, the same was done with the 
collecltion of tax receipts of the program. 
Chartiii shows the cyclical movement of 
collec~ions and personal income. It may be observed 
I 
that c~llections increase with the increase in personal 
incomei and conversely with a decrease. As employment 
increa~es the total payrolls will be larger and conse-
i 
quently a larger tax base, increasing the total collections. 
When efployment is on the decline, payrolls will diminish 
and cahse the total of collections to decrease. As 
I 
mentio~ed in the previous section, funds for the program 
are prfvided through a tax levied on the payroll, thus 
when the payrolls change in amount due to the change in the 
I 
size o~ the labor force, the amount of collections will 
changejaccordingly. The larger any one employer's labor 
I 
I .1 . force 9ecomes, the larger w~ 1 be the amount of collect~ons 
or conJributions that he must pay in to the program. 
During the 1948-1950 recession (See Chartiii), 
personal income dropped to a low of -2.8 standard 
! 
deviatfons on April, 1950; collections fell to a low of 
71 
I 
-2.5 standard deviations in May of 1950. From these 
lows, !personal income and collections rose simultaneously 
i 
to their respective peaks during the period of prosperity 
I 
I 
that ,ollowed the recession. 
I 
1 
During the 1953-1955 recession (See IDhartiii) 
personal income fell to a low of -1.7 standard deviations 
durinJ September, 1954; collections lagged and dropped 
I 
to a ~ow of -2.5 standard deviations in March, 1955. 
Persojal income rose in an erratic fashion to its peak 
befor9 descending again during the 1957-1959 recession. 
Colledtions increased to a peak of 0.1 standard deviations 
and t~en fell sharply to -1.9 deviations before climbing 
to peak levels during the prosperous period that followed. 
I I During the 1957-1959 recession (See Chart III) 
personal income and collections displayed a high degree 
of cor~elation. The movements of both were erratic and 
did no~ display a clear cut cyclical pattern. The rate 
of c~ge was considerab~y greater for collections than 
in the! case of personal ~come. 
I In the three 
changelbetween the two 
I 
; 
situations described, the rates of 
series differed greatly (See Chart 
III), hfwever the important aspect is that the two series 





As mentioned in the previous section, the 
method of taxation is a weakening factor to the prog~am 
functioning as a stabilizer, however, even with this 
limitation, collections are cyclical. The change in the 
tax base which causes a change in collections more than 
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First of all, it is important that not a sub-
stanti~l differential exist between benefits and wages if 
unemplpyment compensation is to be effective as a stabilizer. 
I 
It was1pointed out that benefit increases have not kept 
pace with increases in wages. However, recent benefit 
I 
increases indicate an attempt to regain the relationship 
i 
of benefits to wages as they were in 1940. 
I 
Secondly, it appears from attempting to 
measurJ the decrease in income as compared to the 
I 
increa~e in benefits, that benefits have offset on the 
averag~ of 30 to 40 percent of the decline in labor income 
I 
during jthe downswing phase of the business cycle. It also 
became 1apparent that the longer the period of decline, the 
I 
less w~ll benefits offset the loss in income. This was 
I • 
seen dur~g the 1948-1950 recession when the downswing 
lasted i4 months. Consequently the offset dropped to 16 
1 
percent,. This was not the case during the 1953-1955 
! 
recessipn, when the period of decline was shorter by two 
I 
months,] as the offset only fell to 33 percent. And during 
the 1957-1958 recession a decline of nine months with 
i 
benefit~ maintaining an offset of nearly 40 percent. 
Finally, collections for the program react 







of fu]l or near full employment and decrease during 
i, 
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times lof employment. The method determining the tax 
I 
rate ~llows a reduction in the rate in prosperous 
periodF, thus reducing collections, which is contrary 
to cyc~ical performance. However, the overall change 
i • in thei s~ze of payrolls overcomes this factor. Collect-
! 
ions, Vhich are to move. in an inverse relation to that 
I 
of ben~its, have shown profound cyclical action during 
I 








VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE THE DEGREE OF 
ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO FUNCTION 
AS A STABILIZER 
The preceding chapters disclosed how adequately 
unemployment compensation has functioned as an automatic 
stabilizer between 1948 and 1959, with emphasis on the 
impact of unemployment insurance on the 1948-1950, 1953-
1955, and 1957-1959 recessions. 
This chapter will discuss and analyze some of 
the more important variables that have a direct bearing 
on unemployment compensation functioning as an automatic 
stabilizer. The variables considered are: The degree of 
coverage, the distribution of coverage, the duration of 
benefits, and supplementary unemployment benefits. 
The greater or more widespread the coverage, the 
more adequately may unemployment insurance function as an 
automatic stabilizer. The reason is obvious, as during 
any given period of anemployment the greater the percent 
covered of the total unemployment, and those who are likely 
to become unemployed, the greater will be replacement of 
income. 
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1 The distribution of coverage is an important 
! 
varia~le, because certain industries are more prone to 
! 
cycliqal and seasonal unemployment than others, and it 
1 
is these prone industries which must be covered to allow 
I 
unemp]oyment insurance to function as an automatic 
I 
t b .li. s a ~ '1~zer. 
i 
The next variable is that of the duration of 
• I benef~ts. The shorter the max~um period of time workers 
I 
may draw benefits when unemployed, the less effective will 
i 
unemployment insurance be as an automatic stabilizer. 
The re~son being that if during a period of unemployment 
! 
benefits stop, then the function of offsetting the decline 
! 
I in lab~r income ceases. 
Supplementary unemployment benefits function in 
I 
the sam;e manner as does unemployment insurance, and can, 
I 
if of ~ sufficient magnitude, increase the effectiveness 




Each of these variables will be analyzed to 
point ort its effect upon unemployment insurance as an 
automat~c stabilizer. 
A. I Deg~ee of Coverage. 
The degree of coverage will consider: (1) employees 
covered by state programs, (2) employees covered by the 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, (3) coverage of 
! 
Feder41 employees, (4) coverage of-State and local 
I gover~ment employees, (5) veterans coverage, (6) 
I 
I 
emplo~ees excluded from coverage, and (7) the ~pli-
cation!s of the extent of covered employment. 
! 




In all States there are certain minimum 
78 
requir~ments to be met for a person to qualify as an insured 
I 
worker+ In the first place there is a minimum earnings 
I 
requir4ment in all States; the min~um amount in the 
median \state in 1958 was $300.00 in a quarter. Essentially, 
the provisions require that earnings equal a specified 
I 
multip~e of the weekly benefit amount. In certain States 
I 
it is ~equired that earnings be obtained in more than one 
i calend~r quarter and in other States a certain minimum 
I 
period of employment is required.* In order to beaware 
I 
of the ~ffect of minimum wages on insured States, the 
i 
disalloWffient of new cla~s may be studied. However, 
nbecause wages have apparently moved up faster than 
! 
min~um \ earrd.ngs requirements, the proportion of new 
I 
claims 4isallowed because of insufficient or no wage 
credits 1has steadily declined. Nation-wide, the proportion 
I 
of new qla~s disallowed were 16.0 percent in 1940; 14.9 
*49 P.ltl 
i 
percedt in 1947, and 11.6 percent in 1957. Further 
study !is necessary before too much significance is 
attacb;ed to these data. 11* 
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In the second place there is a requirement 
concerhing the number of employees before a firm is 
I 
coveretl by the program. 
The national requirement, from 1935 until 
Decemb~r 31, 1955, stated that the Federal Unemployment 
I 
Tax ap~lied only to employers who had 8 or more employees, 
I 
and employed them at least 20 weeks per year. On January 
1, 195~, the tax became applicable to employers with 4 
I 
to 7 e~ployees. This increased the coverage by an 
est£ma~ed 1,400,000 employees.** 
! 
As States are free to exclude employers covered 
by the Wederal Act, and to cover those excluded by the 
I 
Federali Act, some States have extended coverage to those 
firms h~ring one or more employees. In 1950 600,000 
I 
workerslwere covered by State laws but not by the Federal 
Act. I~ 1956, 18 States required only one or more workers.*** 
The average number of workers in employment 
i 
covered:by State acts has increased from 20,000,000 in 1938 
l 
* 45 P.4 
** 30 B.2 
***2$ B .. 2· 
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to 36Jooo,ooo in 1955, and increase of 78 percent over 
I. 
1938. I Most of the growth occurred during World War II 
when Jounger people and housewives entered the labor 
force.l The population increase after World War II 
furth~r increased the total of covered employment.* 
2. Co~erage Under the Railroad Insurance Act. 
In 1938 the Federal-State program of unemploy-
' 
ment p~otection was removed from the railway workers 
' 
provid~ng a separate Federal system for the railway 
i 
industry. The Act is known as the Railroad Unemployment 
I 
Insura.ilce Act. 
The number of employees covered was 1,600,000 
in 1940, over 3,000,000 in 1945, and in 1956, 1,200,000. 
I 
As in the case of the State legislation, the 
employcles must earn a min~um amount in a base period. 
I 
In 194~ disqualification wage requirements were around 
17 perdent;** today, however, the percentage of railway 
I, 
employe1es not covered is very small. 
I 
3. Cov~rage of Federal Civilian Employees. 
Passage of Public Law 767 by the 83rd Congress 




employees after December 31, 1954. Known as Title XV 
! 
of th~ Social Security Act, it covers approximately 
i 2,350,000 Federal workers. Thus bringing unemployment 
! 
insurance coverage to approximately 79 percent of all 
! 
non-agj,ricultural workers.* 
Federal workers who are unemployed will become 
entitl1ed to benefits if they meet the requirements of the 
approp~iate State law. Usually that is the law of the 
i 
State fn which they had their last official position in 
Federa~ employment. The State employment security agency 
pays the Federal employees the same benefits as those 
I 
workers in private industry under the same conditions.** 
! 
4. Co~erage of State and Local Government Employees. 
i 
Twenty-two States and the District of Columbia 
I 
have eitended coverage to approximately 251,000 State and 
., 
I 
local Government employees. There still remains on the 
I 
averag~ 4,700,000 workers (State and local Govt.) who are 
not co~ered. Of the estimated 261,000 covered State and 











5. V~terans Coverage. 
Title IV of the Veterans Readjustments Assistance 
I 
I 
Act o~ 1952 provides unemployment compensation payment for 
vetert:ks w'ith service on or after January 27, 1950. 
i 
At the time of passage of the Act it was assumed 
that 11,ooo,ooo veterans, in the first few years following 
I 
1952 wjould be discharged from military service and be 
eligib~e to claim unemployment compensation.* The maximum 
I 
duratibn of benefits under Public law 550 (often called 
the ne~ G.I. Bill) is 26 weeks. 
A benefit rate of $26.00 has been established as 
I 
the ma.:fimum. for the total unemployment, where State benefits 
are greater than $26.00 no Federal payment is made. When 
the I • St~te benef~t payment is less than $26.00 the Federal 
i 
payment makes up the difference.** 
I 
The State benefits are available only to individ-
uals w~o entered military service before February 1, 1955. 
In August, 1958, a Bill amending Title XV of the 
I 
Social ~ecurity Act to extend the unemployment insurance 
to ex-service men became effective. This act covers all 
i 








1, 19d5 who are not eligible for Public Law 550. 
The cla~ants are paid benefits in accordance 
I 
I 
with State unemployment insurance law provisions, and 
I 
are financed by Federal appropriations. 
It was felt in 1959 that the benefits paid 
would range from $.55 to $66 million, with the number of 
! 
ex-s~rrice men claiming benefits est~ated at 130,000 
to 193:,000, with a duration in excess of 14 weeks and the 
I 
averag~ weekly benefit amount to $40.00. In 1960 the 
I 
amount 1 of benefit is est~ated to be $70 million, based 




6. E~clusions from Coverage. 
I 
.Although the number of employees that are 
cover~d is high it does not include all the workers in 
I 
the c~untry. It has been estimated that approximately 
i 
betwe~n 20 and 25 percent of the labor force is excluded 
I 
from the program. These are app~oximately 2,000,000 
I 
worke~s not covered because of size of firm regulations 
that were mentioned before. The~ are also some firms 
' 
which ~re excluded from coverage because they do not 
I 
operat¢ for 20 weeks a year. Further exclusions come 
I 
about from the definition of ••employmentn in the Federal 
I 
Act an~ each State law. In 1956 it was estimated that 
I 
10.5 million civilian workers were excluded from coverage 
I 
because of the definition of employment.* 
I 
The major exclusions and estimates are:** 
I 
* 29 Pi.2 
**29 P.2 
State and local governments 
Domestic Service 
Agricultural employee 











7. I~plications of the Extent of Govered Employment. 
There is estimated to be 44,200,000 workers 
covered by the total programs in effect at present.* 
Workers covered by State laws 
Federal civilian workers 
Railroad workers 
Veterans and Armed Forces 
coverage 






The percent of covered employment under all 
plans to total non-agricultural employment has a direct 
bear~g upon the adequacy of unemployment compensation in 
functlonang as a stabilizer. The greater the coverage of 
course,, the greater the effect is. 
*29 P12 
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Over the years coverage has been extended to 
inclu~e veterans, ex-service men, some State and local 
goverfment emp~oyees, Federa~ civi~ian .emp~oyees, and 
the requirement of the size of firms has been decreased. 
The elfect of this is increased, total coverage and a 
reduciion on the number of exclusions from coverage. 
Total coverage (See Table X) has increased from ?2 
perce1t of the total non-agriculture 
to 82 percent by 1957. 
employeesjri 1938 
It appears that even with the requirement of 
• I • prev~~us earn~gs, and a certain period of employment for 
a worYer to become insured, coverage is ample, and that 
it ha, more than kept pace with the growth in the 
numbe~ of jobs in non-agriculture employment. It is 
probaJ~ly safe to state that time will see the extent 





COVERED EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT 
NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
1938 - 1957 
(1) (2) 
Non-Agricultural Covered Percent 
Year Emp~oyment Employment (Col.2 • Col.l) 
1938 28,900,000 21,022,000 72.7% 
1939 30,300,000 22,529,000 74.3 
1940 32,000,000 24,291,000 75~9 
1941 36,200,000 28,136,000 77.7 
1942 40,000,000 30,819,000 77.0 
1943 42,000,000 32,419,000 77.1 
1944 41,000,000 31,714,000 77.3 
1945 40,000,000 30,087,000 75.2 
1946 41,400,000 31,856,000 76.9 
1947 43,400,000 33,876,000 78.0 
1948 44,300,000 34,646,000 78.2 
1949 43,300,000 33,098,000 76 .. 4 
1950 44,700,000 34,308,000 76.7 
1951 47,300,000 36,334,000 76.8 
1952 48,300,000 37,006,000 76.6 
1953 49,700,000 38,072,000 76.6 
1954 48,400,000 36,617,000 76.6 
1955 50,056,000 40,015,000 79.9 
1956 51,766,000 42,427,000 81.9 
1957 52,610,000 43,285,000 82.2 
Source: Covered Employment and Non-Agriculture Employment 
data was obtained from ';Employment and Wages·•, 






B. Distribution of Coverage. 
I 
1. ~dustrial Distribution. 
I nThe distribution of covered employment among 
industry groups varies from year to year and may change 
marke~ly over a decade or less.N* Most workers are in 
Manuflcturing and Trade, 74 percent in 1945, 70 percent 
in 1911 and 67 percent in 1957. Wholesale and Retail I , . 
tradelhave been increasing from 21 percent in 1945 to 
I . . . just 9ver 25 percent ~n 1957. Serv~ces have r~sen from 
i 
i 
8.4 percent in 1951 to just over 12 percent at the begin-
1 
ning ~f 1958. Table XI is a summary of this distribution. 
I 
2. clmparison of Covered to Total Emplo~ent. 
The percent of coverage in an industry indicates 
89 
TABLE XI. 













































I Source~ The average employment, according to industry, 
was obtained from :'Employment and Wages'', The 




a decline in emp~oyment and income in that industry 
i 
90 
wouldlresult in 28 percent of the loss in income being 
I repla~ed by unemployment compensation for the industry 
I 
as a thole. If the industry were 100 percent covered 
then 4o percent of the loss in income would be replaced. 
I 
I 
Continuing with the assumption that unemploy-
mentment compensation replaces 40 percent of the loss of 
I 
wagesjcaused by unemployment, we may estimate the stabili-
zing ~ffect of the program for each industry group. 
. I . 
TablejXII compares, for each industry group, the covered 
emplotment to the total employment. Mining has 98 percent 
I 
of it~ employees covered, a possible replacement of income 
loss, lduring an economic contraction, of 39 percent. 
i 
Manufacturing has 99 percent coverage and a possible 
I . 
replacrement of 39 percent. Transportation and other 
i 
Publid Utilities have 70 percent coverage, a possible 





avpeelc9enpter.cent coverage, a poss~ble replacement of 
1 
Finance, Real Estate and Insurance have 88 
perce~t coverage, a possible replacement of 35 percent. 
Servi~es have 57 percent coverage, a possible replacement 
of 22!percent. State and local Governments have 4 percent 
cover~ge, a pogible replacement of 1.6 percent. 
The amount of benefits, and the number of 
emplotees covered compared to the total employment, 
I . 
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have k very profound effect on the program functioning 
I 
as a ~tabilizer. For the maximum effect, it is important 
I . 
i . • that each of these factors be adequate, ~.e. ample 
I 





COMPARISON OF AVERAGE COVERED EMPLOYMENT TO 








Indus~ry Em.p1oyment Employment (Col.2 to Col.l) 
Agricq.lture, 
Foretry and· 
Fish·. g 93,000 N.A. 
Min in~ 797,000 807,000 98.8 
I 
Contr~ct Construction 2,638,000 
! 
2,929,000 89.4 
Manuf~cturing 16,781,000 16,903,000 99 .. 5 
Trans~ortation 
and ther Public 
Util:iities 2,939,000 4,161,000 70.1 
i 
Who1e~ale and 
Reta;41 Trade 10,404,000 11,221,000 90.0 
- Finan~e, Real 
Estate and 




3,780,000 6,160,000 58.0 
I 
State~Local 




Average Covered Employment obtained from '·Employment 
and Wages 11 , Department of Labor,Fourth Quarter, 1957. 
Average Total Employment obtained from ~ 1 Employment 
and Earnings:', Department of Labor 1 December, 1957. 
93. 
It becomes apparent that the industries most 
prone tl cyclical fluctuations in employment are the ones 
most adbquately covered. Manufacturing employment, (See 
I and Table XIII) which is relatively unstable, 
ly durable goods, is 99 percent covered. 
Construlction employment, because of weather conditions 
has a gfeat deal of seasonal fluctuation in employment, is 
90 perc~nt coveredo In contrast the relatively stable 
industries, such as transportation, which is 70 percent 
covered, and services 58 percent covered, coverage is 
not as great a percentage as those unstable industries. 
It then appears that the distribution of coverage 
in te s of maintaining purchasing power is such that the 
greatest coverage is in those segments of the economy which 
fluctuations in employment, and a lesser 
amount of coverage in the more stable industries where 
emplojent fluctuates less. 
3. Distribution of the Unemployed. 
It was shown that the percentage of covered 
workers to total workers is greatest in the industries 
cla~ed to be the most stable. A look at the 
XIII) ~omposition of the insured unemployment (See Table shows that 
the gr1atest amount of cyclical unemployment occurs where 















Publib Utilities 49,000 
Wh.oles~le, 
Retail Trade 204,000 
1 
Finance, Insur-























5 .. 6 57.9 
1.6 4.1 
100.0 
Source~ Basic data on the distribution of the Insured 
Unemployed was obtained from the Characteristics 
of the Insured Unemployed, U. S. Department of 
Labor, May, 1957. 
94(a) 
However, there is one aspect of unemployment that 
has not been considered in the discussion of the stability 
of various industries: the seasonal swings of unemployment. 
Table X~~I which depicts the average distribution of 
Insured ~employed during 1957, is concerned only with the 
averagelmonthly total for the year and consequently does 
:::::::f:::: ::~:::::::::,:::~::::::::~::::T:~:~~::::::::: 
characteristics of such a nature that unemployment for· 
that pJ:ticular industry may be more prevalent than appears 
when o+erving the average· monthly amount for the year. 
Unemployment occuring from the seasonal influence is 
of a r t~ic and recurring nature, a problem always present 
ployment is usually of a short nature and can be 
predicted to a great extent. 
[ The problem of seasonal movements of employment is 
one t:t should be mentioned but it is not re~~ient to the 
preble of anti-cyclical policy and cnnsequently is not part 
of the analysis. 
20 Mill ions of persons 
J 
!7 
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llHow adequate is the distribution of coverage in 
respect1
1 
to economic stabilization?H Ideally the distri-
I 
bution bf coverage should be as near as 100 percent as 
possibl~ in those industries which are characterized by 
I 
fluctuation in employment. It was observed that the industries 
in the United States which have the greatest fluctuation in 
I 
I 
employment are the ones with the highest coverage. Manu-
facturi~g, for example is 99 percent covered in terms of 
,, 
total manufacturing unemployment. The same thing is observed 
·in other industries although not quite as high a percentage 
I 
of coverjed employees. It was further observed that those 
i 
industri~s with the higher percentages of total insured 
i 
unemploy~d were those industries with the highest coverage. 
I Stable industries on the other hand where coverage 
I 
does not1need to be so great were found to be the lowest 
in terms of percent of covered employees. For example the 
services :industry with coverage of 57 percent constituted 
I 
5 percent of the insured unemployed. 
I 
1 Thus it may be concluded that the distribution 
of covera~e is adequate, extending the greatest coverage 
97 
to t~e industries characterized by fluctuations in employ-
ment,! and the least coverage to those industries 
charabterized by little fluctuations in employment. 
C. Duration of Benefits. 
Unemployment insurance in the United States is 
sociat insurance against temporary unemployment and 
therefore.has its shortcomings during periods of pro-
i 
longed unemployment. 
It stands to reason when there is any injection 
to th~ income stream of the economy and the effect of 
this ~jection is being analyzed in terms of its effect 
on co~teracting the cycle and adding to stability of 
I 
I emplo~ent and income, that when the injection is&opped, 
so is the effect on stability as long as the economy has 
I 
not returned to full employment. 
To perform the function of a built-in stabilizer 
the system of unemployment insurance must inject funds 
I 
into t~e income stream during periods of unemployment and 
withdr4wn funds during full and over full employment, 
I 
this wtlen funds are not forthcoming during employment, 




1. The Potential Duration. 
All insured cla~ants are not eligible for the 
maximUm duration of benefits in certain States, where 
i 
the d~ation of benefits varies with previous employment 
and wages. Thus it is important to show the min~u.ril. and 
maximUm. duration of benefits. 
' 
At the beginningaf the program all States but 6 
limit~d benefits to 16 weeks or less, by 1952, 19 States 
(coveriing over 60 percent of insured workers) had a 
maximcin benefit duration of 26 weeks. These States having 
a maximum duration of 26 weeks increased to 33 States by 
I 
I 1958 and covered almost 80 percent of insured workers.* 
Along with the increase maximum duration of 
I 
benefits, there have been increases in the minimum allowed. 
In many States the duration of benefits varies with previous 
I 
' 
earnings or employment, the maximum duration becomes 
limited to a fraction of the workers base period wages. 
Changes in State laws since 1952 have resulted in only 11 
I 
States ihaving less than a 10 week minimum as compared to 
I 




2. The Exhaustion Ratio. 
It is important to know just how much of the 
potential maximum duration has been used up in the past. 
The exhaustion ratio reflects the degree of adequacy 
I 
of benefits during periods of unemployment and further-
! 
more, i it reflects the success of unemployment com.pen-
sation as a stabilizer. 
ttNeedless to say, the number of workers who are 
still ',unemployed when they receive their last benefit":-,.~_·,, 
I /,~~.)~""· • ....; --~ 
check 1
1
- the number of benefit exhaustions - is ~~:·'critic~l 
i 




Exhaustion of benefits are usually exp~~ssed :~s --
a percentage of those receiving benefits. In tracing 
this percentage it was found that in 1940 the exhaustion 
percentage was over 50 percent, less than 20 percent during 
the Se9ond World War, 30 percent in 1950, 23 percent in 
1957, *nd in 1958 a national percentage of 29 percent, 






3. T~mporary Extension Benefits. 
I 
June 19, 1958, the Temporary Unemployment 
Compemsation Act of 1958 became effective. The Act 
i 
100 
provided that unemployment benefits could be extended 
to pe~sons who since June 30, 1957, had exhausted 
' 
their,benefits. Temp~rary benefits were payable to 
claim~ts under the laws of States which have entered 
into ~greement with the Secretary of Labor to partici-
pate ~ the program. 
Under this program a claimant who had exhausted 
I 
all hi~ benefit rights was entitled to benefits equal 
I 
to onethalf of the total amount he received in the 




March , 1959, was considered to be the original 
expiration date. However, in 34 States temporary unemploy-
ment benefits were continued to June 30, 1959.** 
By September, 1958, nearly 1,938,000 workers 
had exhausted their benefits and by March, 1959, 
1,900,000 persons had received temporary unemployment 
benefi~s. Bpring the period of June, 1958 to March, 




I unemp~oyment benefits. By the end of March over $536 
millipn had been paid out in temporary benefits.* 
I 
i 
4~ The Effect of Temporary Benefits on Stabilization. 
The effect of these temporary employment 
benefits is obvious, they have helped unemployment 
compe!sation in functioning as a built-in stabilizer 
I 
simplt through the extending of benefits during the 
perio4 of unemployment. 
I 
5. Cqnclusion. 
The rate of exhaustion of unemployment benefits 
has b~en found to be 40 percent in 1940, falling to 
I 
vario~s low levels during the War and Post-War prosperity, 
and th!en climbing to over 40 percent in certain States 
I 
during; the 1957-1959 recession. Thus the exhaustion of 
unempl;oym.ent benefits has been shown to be a problem to 
the intlividual out.of work and out of benefits, and to the 
stabilkty functions of unemployment insurance. 
I 
The extension of unemployment compensation 
helped to prevent the reduction of the addition to the 
income!stream during the last recession. However, the 
I 
* 35 :t>.24 
expirktion of benefits is a serious drawback to 
I 
unemployment compensation functioning as a built-in 
I 
stabilizer and still a more serious drawback to its 
I 
effect as a stabilizer. 
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D. Supplementary Benefits as a Stabilizer Assistant to 
Unemployment Compensation. 
1. What are Supplementary Unemployment Benefits? 
Supplementary unemployment benefits are not 
simply unemployment benefits, they are unemployment 
benefits intended to bring a State system benefit ·up to 
some higher agreed-upon level. They are paid only if the 
employee is genuinely unemployed and receives a State 
system benefit. 
As initially contemplated, S. U. B. plans would 
increase the total income of the laid-off employee from 
the State benefit level to roughly 60% to 65% of his take-
home pay. Under S. U. B. plans the employee must (in most 
cases) be entitled to receive unemployment benefit. Only if 
he qualifies and if he receives a State benefit may he be 
entitled to receive a S. U. B. payment. The S. U. B. 
allowance is not a flat amount but is c~mputed by deduct-
ing from the agreed-upon total benefit, the amount of 
State benefit received. 
IDnder the S. U. B. plan, initiated by the Ford 
Motor Company, no employee is allowed to receive an s. u. B. 
unless the employee has received a State benefit; with 
these exceptions: 
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' tt(l) ~n which the State has a second •waiting week• of 
unemptoyment before benefits are payable, (2) in which 
i 
the e~ployee did not have sufficient service under the 
I 
State,system to be entitled to State benefits are payable 
! 
has bTen exhausted.* 
If a worker is earning $84.00 on straight tDne 
per wJek, his total unemployment benefit the first few 
I 
weeks 1would be $50.00 but he must first receive State 
benefit, which for example is $33.00, then he is entitled 
I 
to $17.00 as a supplement to the State benefit.** 
The supplemental unemployment benefit plans as 
they ~volved in l955t may be classified as payments to be 
made firom employer-contributed reserve funds to laid-off 
emplo~ees. As was mentioned, these company payments are a 
suppl~ment to existing State unemployment benefits that 
laid-o~f employees are qualified to receive. 
Payments are deferred until employees are laid 
I 
off. So that supplementary unemployment compensation 
! 
becomes an addition to unemployment compensation as a 
I 
stabilizing function. 
* 13 p~ 1 
**13 p~ 2 
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2. T~e Effect of S. U. B. on Unemployment Compensation. 
Much controversy has existed since 1955 with the 
' 
inception of the Ford plan as to whether the objective of 
unemployment compensation as administered by the States 
has b~en undermined by supplement unemployment benefits. 
The ~L-CIO feels that State unemployment compensation is 
assisted by S. U. B. in fulfilling its objectives. 
111. First and foremost, of course, is the stated 
po~icy of the statute to lighten the impact 
of involuntary unemployment by setting aside 
reserves during periods of unemployment. 
S.U.B. plans represent simply private imple-
mentation and supplementation of this basic 
statutory purpose. They provide simply for 
the accumulation of additional reserves 
during periods of employments so as to 
supplement the basic benefit provided by 
the State in periods of unemployment. As 
in the case of pensions and other social 
benefits, the statute provides a minimum 
benefit applicable to all, commensurate 
with the legislative judgment as to the 
level of benefits which, on an over-all 
basis, can reasonably be charged to the 
community. Private plans freely negotiated 
between employers and Unions serve to supple-
ment this basic benefit as the resources which 
the parties are able to agree should be 
devoted to this purpose permit. As in the 
case of pensions, this does not involve any 
contradiction of the legislative purpose in 
establishing the basic benefit but, rather, 
private action in aid of that purpose. 
In essence, S.U.B. plans simply say to the 
States: You have established a system for 
unemployment benefits. We simply wish to 
add additional amounts to the minimum bene-
fits which you provide. 
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0 2. A second basic objective of unemployment 
compensation legislation is to 'encourage 
stabilization of employment' and thus to 
avoid unemployment, as well as to provide 
benefits in cases in which unemployment 
occurs. To this end, many States have 
adopted e~erience-rating systems so that 
the contributions of those employers who 
have a high incidence of unemployment" 
are greater than those who maintain employ-
ment at stable levels. S.U.B. plans do not 
effect this small and rather ineffective 
incentive for ~tabilization. But they add 
a much larger and more direct incentive for 
stabilization. In the long run, each 
employer's contribution to the fund estab-
lished by S.U.B. plan will depend directly 
on the amount of unemployment among its 
workers. By thus establishing a direct 
cost of unemployment, S.U.B. supplies a 
substantial incentive for employers to make 
the expenditures for warehouses, inventories, 
etc., as well as the changes in selling and 
production methods, which are often necessary 
to avoid layoffs. Furthermore, it supplies 
an incentive for employe~s who cannot avoid 
layoffs to find other employment for their 
workers. In so doing, supplementary unemploy-
ment benefits not only helps to achieve the 
statutory purpose of preventing unemployment~: 
it also reduced the potential drain on State 
Unemployment Compensation funds.* 
A. T~e Countercyclical Effect of Supplementary Benefits. 
As mentioned before, payments are deferred until 
employbes are laid off so that at the expansionary stage of 
the cyble some inflationary pressure may be removed by 
curbin~ funds that could have been used as increased wages. 
Duringl the contractionary phase of the business cycle 




decreksing consumer demand. 
Sumner H. Slichter is of the opinion that 
S.U.B~ plans will add to the stability of the economy 
1 
by in~reasing the income of the unemployed during a 
! 
reces$ion,however, such a small percent of the total labor 
force'is covered, there will not be a substantial effect 
on st~bility. He feels that: HThe only way in which we 
can get the stabilizing effect that we need from adequate 
i 
unemployment compensation benefits is through greatly 
! 
liberalizing the benefits paid under the State scheme. 
! 
In th9-t way some forty million workers would be effected.* 
Supplementary benefits do not exercise any sub-
stant~al influence on unemployment compensation acting as 
an eco~omic stabilizer, due to the following reasons: (1) 
only 3! percent of the labor force is covered by S. U. B., 
and (2') benefits under the S. U. B. programs have at any 
I 
one tike only equaled 0.5 percent of the benefits paid by 
unemplpyment compensation (25 million as contrasted to 5 
billion). However, we should not discount the importance 
of supplementary benefits to unemployment compensation 
because they do add to the unemployed worker's benefits, 
i 
and even though only a small portion of the labor force 
has th~se benefits available to them, everyone benefits 
because of the curbing effect on declining consumer demands. 
I 
*19 P.45 
Thus ~ven though the effect is slight, ''every little 
i 
bit h~lps", to use a trite expression. 
I 
108 
In attempting to stimulate economic recovery, 
I . 
one measure by itself is seldom sufficient and it is the 
I 
i totalieffect of all various measures that becomes 
I 
Dnportant in terms of economic recovery. 
From this the conclusion may be drawn S. U. B. 
' i 
are somewhat important in assisting unemployment 
i 
compefsation to act as a stabilizer and will increase 
in importance as S. U. B. are extended to more workers. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This Thesis has been an attempt to analyze the 
effectiveness of unemployment compensation to function 
as an1automatic stabilizer. This report has been divided 
into five parts each comprising a chapter. The first 
I 
chapt~r dealt with the objectives of unemployment insurance; 
the second chapter determined whether or not unemployment 
I 
insur~nce should be considered as an automatic stabilizer; 
the third and fourth chapters analyzed the past results 
of un~mployment insurance in performing as an automatic 
stabilizer; and the fifth chapter dealt with the varmous 
varia~les that could and do effect unemployment insurance 
in fuqctioning as a stabilizer. 
A. Oqjectives. 
Opinions, attitudes and objectives, like everything 
else, :change over time. The thoughts of individual respon-
I 
sibilf.!ty in terms of unemployment, have been discarded by 
many in favor of the thought of collective responsibility, 
I 
that is, unemployment is beyond the control of the individual 
firm, ~nd becomes the responsibility of the community. 
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With the development of Keynesian economic 
thought and emphasis on aggregate economics, the value 
I 
of what is termed "automatic stabilizers" came to be 
I 
apprebiated by economists, public officials and laymen. 
Today~ unemployment of any great magnitude is considered 
to be!a responsibility of the Government, and beyond the 
! 
' 
contr61 of individuals, yet within the control of the 
I 
Gover~ent. These individuals with a knowledge of 
i 
econo~ics well know the importance of any arrangement 
that ~perates in a countercyclical fashion, and unemploy-
' ment ~ompensation has been considered to be one of these 
i 
arrangements. 
Today the Government considers the objectives 
! 
! 
to beT (1) to help maintain consumer purchasing power, 
thus helping to brake downturns in business activity; (2) 
I 
a majc!>r approach in alleviating the problems of short-term 
1 
unemptoyment; (3) to cushion the initial effects of a 
i 




B. U~employment Compensation and Automatic Stabilizers. 
I 
I 
Automatic stabilizers must go into action without 
delayior need for new legislation. They must add to the 
. i 
Natio~ts income during periods of contraction and remove 
I 





I t. compensa ~on; 
I 
by requiring only a waiting period of one 
i 
week,ipaying out cash during periods of contracting 
I 
I 
incom~, and accumulating reserves during periods of full 
I 
emplorroent, fulfills the requirements necessary to be 
consitlered as an automatic stabilizer. 
i 
C. Cpuntercyclical Impact on Transfer Payments. 
Transfer payments were observed to have a counter-
i 
cycli¢al movement, that is, moving in the opposite direction 
to th~ movements of personal income during the past three 
recessions. Of the various components of transfe~ payments, 
I 
unemployment insurance has comprised between 8 and 20 
I 
perce~t, the latter amount during unemployment periods. 
I 
Unemployment insurance was and is responsible for the 
I 
i 
counttrcyclical movement of transfer payments, comprising 
betwe~n 75 and 86 percent of the incremental change of 
I 
! 
transfer paymen~s downturns of personal income. 
D. P~~formance of Benefits and Collections. 
i Considering the effect unemployment compensation 
0 1. has ~~ the loss of purchasing power, benefits have tended 
i 
to 1ai behind wage increas~ causing the proportion of 
I 
benef~ts to wages to have decreased since 1939. This has 
i 
I 
tended to reduce the effectiveness as a stabilizer; 
howev~r, progress has been made as many States since 1954 
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II 
have !increased benefits, so that at the present, benefits 
I 
constlitute 36 percent of average wages as compared to 32 
I 
I • percJ:t ~n 1953. To function as a stabilizer it is 
impor1tant to replace as much as possible of the purchasing 
I 
I poweJ:I lost. Even though the replacement of income by 
I 
benefjits is not as high a percentage as could be desir-
1 
able,l indications are that benefits will tend to increase, 
becau~e there is becoming an increasing awareness of the 
I 
I impor~ance of unemployment compensation maintaining 
purch~sing power for economic stability. 
I 
In measuring the degree of impact of unemploy-
ment ~enefits on the loss of labor income in the past 
I 
threejrecessions, it was disclosed that at the beginning 
of eabh downturn in labor income, benefits offset roughly 
I 
I 
15 petcent of the loss in income, increasing to approximately 
I 
35 petcent on the decline in income after the first few 
I 
I 
months, and then decreasing in proportion to the decline 
! 
i 
• • I ~n ~come. The longer the period of the downturn of labor 
I 
incom~ the less successful was unemployment compensation in 
I 
I 
offse~ting the decline in income. The 1949-1950 recession 
witnelsed the ability of benefits to offset declines in 
incom~, drop to 16 percent. In measuring from peak to 
! 
troug~, unemployment benefits offset the decline in income 
I 
j 
by an:average of 30 percent. 
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As far as financing the program is concerned, 
the crllections or contributions were found to have a 
cycli al pattern, rising and falling with personalincome. 
to be reduced, via a rate reduction, during periods of 
high evel economic activity. This is in opposition to 
! 
I 
the i~verse relationship that benefits and collections 
I 
must ~isplay to render unemployment compensation effective 
' 
as ani automatic stabilizer. 
E. T~e Influence of Variables. 
1
1 The degree of coverage, the distribution of 
coverlge, duration of benefits and supplementary benefits 
I 
I . 
all have a profound effect on unemployment compensation 
functloning as an automatic stabilizer. 
I 
I It was.estimated the 44,200,000 persons in 1958 
were Jovered by unemployment insurance. Covered employment 
I . 
as a ~ercent of total non-agriculture employment has 
stead~ly increased from 72 percent in 1938 to 82 percent in 
1958. I Thus coverage bas been increasing at a faster pace 
than Jhe increase in the labor force. The total exclusions 
from Joverage amounted to 10,600,000 persons in 1956 which 
incluJed State and local government employees, domestic 
servides, agriculture and non-profit organizations. Thus 






employment is due primarily to those exclusions above 
which represent stable employment to a great extent. 
The distribution of coverage in comparison to the 
number of workers in various industries has an important 
eHect on unemployment compensation functioning as a 
stabilizer. Those industries which are most prone to 
cyclical unemployment are those industries which are 
adequately covered. 99 percent in manufacturing, 90 percent 
in construction, as compared to a stable industry; public 
utilities which is 70 percent covered. A correlation 
exists between the industrial attachment of unemployed 
workers and amount of coverage of the industry. For 
example, manufacturing in 1957 comprised 50 percent of the 
unemployed and is 98 percent covered. In comparison the 
service industry has a coverage of 57 percent and constituted 
in 1957, 5 percent of the unemployed. 
Thus it may be concluded that the distribution of 
coverage is adequate - extending the greatest coverage to 
those industries which have the greatest fluctuation in 
employment, and the least amount of coverage to those 
industries with the least amount of employment fluctuation. 
The expiration of benefits results in the 
cessation of the compensatory feature of unemployment 
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insur~nce at a time when most needed. Periods of pro-
longe~ unemployment or decline in labor income may 
result in benefits declining, which was the case during 
the lp58 recession. 
Various States have extended the max~um 
durat~on period so that by 1958, 80 percent of the 
coverbd workers had a max~um duration of 26 weeks. 
In m~y industrial States during the last recession, 
and o~hers, the rate of exhaustion rose to a substantial 
I 
percehtage; 40 percent in seven States and a national 
avera~e of 29 percent. The exhaustion of benefits has 
proved to be a very serious problem to unemployment 
insur~nce. In 1958 the temporary extension of unemploy-
ment penefits came into being; the effect of them on 
unemployment compensation functioning as a stabilizer is 
obvidus. The problem of the exhaustion of benefits still 
remains and seriously hampers the stability of unemployment 
i 
compensation to act as a stabilizer in anything but brief 
periqds of unemployment unless the temporary extension of 
benefits is allowed. 
i 
I 
Supplementary unemployment benefits constitute 
I 
an addition to unemployment compensation in terms of 
I 
benefiits paid to workers. Added together the total benefits 
become 60 to 65 percent of the loss in income, thus increasing 
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the a?ility of unemployment compensation to cushion the 
I 
loss of purchasing power. In periods of full employment, 
s. U. 'B. syphons off funds that could have been used as 
I 
incre~sed wages in the same manner that unemployment 
compensation taxes business firms and accumulates 
reserves. 
S. U. B. are not a substantial influence on 
unemp~oyment compensation functioning as a stabilizer 
simply because the amount of benefits paid out constitute 
! 
a small percentage to total unemployment benefits ($25 
million incontrast to approximately $5 billion) and the 
I 
proportion of the labor force covered (3.9%) is exception-
ally ~mall. The mechanism of S. U. B. is in perfect 
coord~nation with employment compensation functioning as a 
stabi;Lizer, it is the magnitude and coverage which renders 
the influence slight. As S. U. B. becomes more widespread, 
the g~eater will be the effect on unemployment compensation, 
and indications are that they will grow, although how much 
or how fast is unknown. 
', 
F. O~erall Conclusions. 
To sum up the conclusions obtained: 
1. The objective of unemployment compensation is 
to function as a stabilizer in the economy; acting as a 






2. Unemployment compensation fills the require-
mentsl of an automatic&abilizer: by going into action 
I 
withort delay, injecting funds into the economy during 
decl~es in income, and withdrawing funds in periods 







3. Unemployment compensation was shown 
statifticall~ and mathematically to be reasponsible 
I 
for t~e countercyclical movements of transfer payments 
I 





4. Rising incomes have resulted in an increasing 
I dispa~ity between benefits and wages. This has resulted 
I 
in t~e ability of benefits to replace the loss of income 
I 
to de:cline. The impact of unemployment compensation on 
I 
the l~st three recessions amounted to a replacement of 
I 
30 pe~cent of the decline in labor income duringthe down-
1 
ward kovements, i.e., peak to trough. The longer the 
I . 
perio~ of downturn, the less effective was unemployment 
I 
compe~sation in replacing the loss in purchasing power, 
I 
thus revealing that unemployment compensation performs 
the f~ction of a stabilizer most satisfactorily in brief 
i 




Tax collections have been found to possess a 
cyclibal pattern, operating in an inverse relation to 
! 





! • fu:P.ct~on as a stabilizer. The methofi of computing the 
tax rrte for business firms has resulted in the reduction 
of co~lections during prosperous periods when it is 
. I 




5. The coverage of the labor force has been 
incre~sing at a faster rate than the increase in the labor 
i 
f orcel. The distribution of the coverage is found to be 
! 
the g~eatest in the industries most prone to cyclical 
! 
unemp~oyment. The duration of benefits has been 
I 
incre)asing; yet the exhaustion of benefits prevents 
I . 




stabilizer in anything but brief periods of unemploy-
! 
ment. 1 The temporary extension of benefits helped to 
I 
eorre:ct this basic weakness during the last recession. 
I 
I 
: Supplementary benefits render little influence 
I 
I 
on thje stabilization function because the amount of benefits 
! 
paid iout in proportion to total unemployment benefits is 
I 
very !small, and the number of workers covered by the 










TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES 
_ ~9if._O_-_l.9_5_8_ _ 
1940 1949 1950 1951 1954 
Average number of - - - - -. 
workers in covered jobs 
(millions) 23.1 31.7 32.9 34.09 35.4 
Insured claimants 
(millions) 6.1 8.8 6.2 5.3 7.7 
Total beneficiaries 
(millions) 5.2 7.4 5.2 4.1 6.6 
Coverage workers of 
weeks of benefits 9.8 11.8 13.0 10.1 12.8 
Coverage weekly 
payments $10.56 $20.48 $20.76 $21.09 $24.93 
Total who exhausted 
benefits 
(millions) 2.6 1.9 1.9 0.8 1.8 


















STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF PERSONAL INCOME 1948-1959 
----------- ~--- ---------- --~-------- --- -------~~------
MONTH 1948 1959 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
- - - - - - - - -
Jan. 1.33 lo87 .58 1.25 1.41 - .29 -1.41 -.16 .29 -.10 -.20 
Feb. .50 -1.95 .29 1.04 1.29 - .45 -1.45 -.29 .37 -.47 -.08 
Mar. - .29 -1.45 .45 .54 1.45 - • 66 -1.29 -.25 .so -.54 ., .25 
Apr. - .45 -2.66 .83 .45 1.12 - • 91 -1.04 -.04 .41 -.58 ..45 
May 
- • 79 -2.79 .75 .58 1.25 - .53 - .87 -.04 .54 -.58 
June -1.16 -2.16 .70 .70 1.25 -1.00 -1.00 .04 .62 -.45 
July -1.83 -1.75 .75 .04 1.25 -1.29 - • 66 -.04 .58 -.20 
A~g. -1.70 -1.08 • 75 • 75 .95 -1.50 - .83 .29 .54 -.25 
Sept. 2.54 -2.12 - .62 1.12 1.20 .66 . -1.50 - .66 .33 .37 -.20 
Oct. 2.29 -2.58 - .37 1.62 1.33 .70 -1.70 - .66 .54 .16 -.37 
Nov. 2.04 -2.37 .. .20 1.25- 1.08 .41 -1.10 - .45 .50 -.04 -.20 




STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF TRANSFER PAYMENTS 1948-1959 
--------------- -----~-------~ ---- ---------- -- - -------------~----------
MONTH 1948 1.949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
- - - - -
Jan. .38 3.0 -.04 -.40 -.53 -.47 -.11 -.11 -.08 .70 .56 
Feb. .52 4.5 -.27 -.57 -.62 -.43 -.14 -.11 -.05 .63 .56 
Mar. .90 5.0 -.31 -.60 -.53 -.22 -...06 -.08 
--
.84 .56 
Apr. .94 7.2 -.35 -.65 -.58 -.22 -.03 -.08 .17 1.13 
May .78 .90 -.15 -.59 -.65 -.27 -.08 -.08 .35 1.16 
June .64 .50 -.15 -.66 -.67 -.27 -.22 -.13 .30 1.04 
July .64 .10 -.26 -. 72 -.71 . -.30 -.31 -.16 .22 1.13 
Aug. .63 -.08 -.26 -.51 -.70 -.42 -.34 -.13 .17 1.17 
Sept. .40 .67 -.37 -.41 -.48 -.72 -.28 -.36 -.18 .15 1.19 
Oct. .20 .35 -.12 -.34 -.51 -.47 -.18 -.37 -.15 .33 1.14 
Nov. .14 .48 -.28 -.47 -.60 -.68 -.23 -.36 -.15 .50 1.04 
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